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I.

INTRODUCTION

Reactions to the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council,1 which held that federal legislation
preempted Massachusetts' restrictions on public purchases from companies doing business with Burma, have been fairly typical for high-stakes
litigation: the victorious plaintiffs, eager to vindicate their prosecution
of a highly controversial test case, emphasized the decision's value as
precedent for future cases,2 while Massachusetts' supporters, looking for
* Assistant Professor, Department of Legal Studies, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. Harvard, J.D. Yale. I benefited from comments by Curtis Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, Mike Ramsey, and Peter Spiro, and from panel discussions at the annual meetings of the
American Society of International Law.
1. 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote a separate concurrence that differed principally on methodological grounds. Id. at 2302; see infra at text accompanying notes 5, 98.
2. Daniel O'Flaherty, vice president of the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), conceded
the public relations hazards of siding with the Burmese government, but explained that "'we were
testing the principle of subfederal units' to influence foreign policy." James Risen, Trade Ruling
Is Victory for Oil Giant, N.Y. T IMES, June 20, 2000, at A23. Frank Kittridge, the NFTC's president, claimed that "the Supreme Court's decision . . . reaffirms the federal government's predominant role in foreign policy and should help put an end to state and local efforts to make foreign
policy." USA Engage, Supreme Court Rules Massachusetts Burma Law Unconstitutional, June
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latitude to address other human rights pariahs, instead stressed Crosby's
narrow compass.3 What's more striking are the pains the decision took
to minimize its own import, so much so as to obscure why the Court
granted certiorari in the first place. The First Circuit had also enjoined
the Massachusetts law on the grounds that it interfered with the federal
government's foreign affairs power and the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause,4 giving the Supreme Court the chance to resolve the important
question of when, if ever, state foreign-relations activities are constitutional. By affirming solely on Burma-specific preemption grounds,
however, the Court unanimously collapsed on the narrowest and least
universal basis for its result – elaborating to such an extent on the particular legislative context as to provoke Justice Scalia's objection that
the majority was wasting space.5 Early academic commentary, understandably, claims that Crosby had little or no significance beyond
Burma 6 – or, as a subsequent case put it, was limited to circumstances in
19, 2000 <http://www.usaengage.org/supremecourt.html>; see also Don Finefrock, Supreme
Court Ruling on Massachusetts Law Kills Florida County's Cuba Policy, MIAMI HERALD , June
21, 2000 (reporting views of attorneys for Miami-Dade County that Crosby "spelled the end of
the local policy" prohibiting the use of public funds in business with Cuba).
3. Thomas Barnico, the Assistant Attorney General for Massachusetts who represented the
state in the Supreme Court, commented that:
[Crosby is narrow] in that it refers specifically to the federal action regarding Burma in
1996. The companies sought a ruling that would have been far broader, which would
have denied to the states and cities an opportunity ever to act in this way. By limiting
its decision to pre-emption, and pre-emption that concerns only the 1996 act as to
Burma, the court has left open very broad que stions about whether state and local go vernments can ever act in this way, particularly where Congress has not acted . . . . In the
future, if Congress has not acted as to a particular foreign country, this decision would
say nothing about whether states and city governments can act first.
Morning Edition: Thomas Barnico, Massachusetts Assistant Attorney General, on Supreme Court
Ruling that States Are Not Permitted To Set Their Own Foreign Policy (National Public Radio,
June 20, 2000); see also Burma Thanks the Court, W ASHINGTON P OST, June 25, 2000, at B6
("The Court's decision is mercifully narrow . . . States should still be able to enact laws, as Massachusetts did, that may then push Congress itself to act.").
4. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), aff'd sub nom.
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000). The district court, ironically,
found preemption the only ground that was not convincing. See National Fo reign Trade Council
v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 287, 293 (D. Mass. 1998), aff'd sub nom. National Foreign Trade Council v.
Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000).
5. Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2304 (Scalia, J., concurring) (calculating that if unnecessary references to legislative statements were omitted, the majority opinion might be one-tenth shorter).
6. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, State Foreign Policies After the Burma Case (visited Oct. 29,
2000) <http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20000626_goldsmith.html> (asserting that
"[t]he decision . . . has no implications for state foreign relations beyond state laws regulating
transactions with Burma"). Peter Spiro has substantially agreed, observing that "Crosby does not
dictate the limits of state and local action in other foreign policy contexts," while noting that the
Court's rationale is similar to that invoked in constitutional arguments for an exclusiv e federal
role. Peter Spiro, U.S. Supreme Court Knocks Down State Burma Law (June 2000)
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which a state law "directly conflicted with a specific federal act and was
preempted by Congress's specific delegation of power to the President."7
Without underestimating Burma's importance, this limited holding
would be an incidental accomplishment for a case that raised much
broader issues – and which wound up, almost in spite of itself, as the
first Supreme Court argument to grapple with globalization, and its first
decision mentioning the World Trade Organization (WTO). But Crosby
means more for U.S. foreign relations law than early appraisals would
suggest. As this Comment explains, the Court's opinion displays a constitutionally-premised sensitivity to international comity, and to the
President's foreign relations powers, in a way that illuminates contemporary disputes about their proper function. At the same time, its preemption analysis demonstrates the dangers of focusing exclusively on
statutory questions, as well as the threat posed by the Court's underlying
commitment to avoiding constitutional questions that crucially define
the practice of foreign relations.
II.

CROSBY IN CONTEXT

Crosby concerned a Massachusetts state law, enacted in June 1996,
that precluded state purchases from companies "doing business" with
Burma, subject to certain exceptions.8 The Massachusetts law, nearly a
carbon copy of its legislation targeting apartheid-era South Africa, 9
gave the state a bit of a head start over the federal government, but
Congress and the executive branch had already been considering sanctions for some time, and three months later enacted a comprehensive

<http://asil.org/insigh46.htm>; see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Overturn State Law on
Myanmar, N.Y. T IMES, June 20, 2000, at A23 ("[O]nce you get outside the Burma context, this
decision is of limited utility in trying to bat back state and local efforts to make foreign policy.")
(quoting Professor Spiro); Mark B. Rees, Supreme Court Strikes Down Massachusetts Law on
Narrow Grounds, I NT'L L. NEWS, Fall 2000, at 16 ("Rather than serve as a landmark in the jurisprudence of foreign affairs and the constitution, Crosby v. NFTC exemplifies what has been characterized as this Court's guiding philosophy of 'judicial minimalism.'"); The Supreme Court, 1999
Term – Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 179, 349, 353-54 (2000) (“The Supreme Court's decision in Crosby, because of its narrow reliance upon preemption, did not adequately settle the important constit utional questions the First Circuit had raised – specifically, whether foreign affairs
are indeed an exceptionally centralized realm of politics.").
7. Mukaddam v. Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations, 111 F. Supp. 457,
473 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2000).
8. See MASS. GEN . LAWS ANN . ch. 7, §§ 22G, 22H, 22I (West 1998).
9. The law's drafters adapted a South Africa sanctions law by simply substituting the word
"Burma" for "South Africa." Carey Goldberg, After Defeat, Campaigner for 'Free Burma' Begins
Anew, N.Y. T IMES, June 24, 2000, at A6.
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federal measure – one conspicuously omitting any reference to existing
state and local measures.10
Even beforehand, the Massachusetts law raised obvious, if unresolved, issues of foreign relations federalism. The orthodox approach
had relegated state activities touching on foreign relations to a constitutional nether world. A long line of Supreme Court dicta 11 and academic
commentary12 attributed to the federal government a monopoly on foreign relations, but without the firm basis in text or precedent that might
have established a self-enforcing principle. In fact, the national government tolerated considerable state and local deviance, in the form of
regulations, resolutions, and economic and diplomatic relations.13 Still,
10. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166 (1997). Post -Crosby commentary frequently credits
Massachusetts for having "push[ed] Co ngress itself to act," see, e.g., Burma Thanks the Court,
supra note 3, at B06, but the politics were considerably more complicated than that suggests.
Both governments acted on the heels of a particularly repressive crackdown by the Burmese government. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Burmese Crackdown May be Tactical Victory for Opposition,
N.Y. T IMES, May 25, 1996, at 4; Hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
And Urban Affairs (1996) (testimony of Kent Wiedemann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs). Federal legislation also progressed because the Senate
yielded to Clinton administration demands for flexibility and, as noted below, because the administration's effort at a multilateral approach was essentially failing. The absence of any mention of Massachusetts' law during congressional debates surely undermines the argument that it
was pivotal.
11. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941):
The Federal Government, representing as it does the collective interests of the fortyeight states, is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs
with foreign sovereignties. . . . [T]he interest of the cities, counties and states, no less
than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal
power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference. . . .
See also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) ("[I]n respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purpose the State . . . does not exist."); Edward
T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE
L.J. 1127, 1221 n.331 (2000) [hereinafter Swaine, Negotiating Federa lism] (citing additional
cases).
12. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federa lism, 83 VA . L. REV.
1617, 1632 (1997) [hereinafter Goldsmith, Federal Courts] (noting "a remarkable consensus
about the legitimacy of the federal common law of foreign relations"); Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 832, 832-33 (1989) ("The consensus today is that the central Government alone may directly exercise power in foreign affairs.
Most current controversy about the foreign affairs power concerns its distribution among the federal branches, not whether it resides in the nation rather than the states."); LOUIS HENKIN ,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 150 (2d ed. 1996) ("At the end of
the twentieth century as at the end of the eighteenth, as regards U.S. foreign relations, the states
'do not exist'.").
13. For valuable overviews, see EARL H. FRY , T HE EXPANDING ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1998); JOHN M . KLINE , STATE GOVERNMENT
I NFLUENCE I N U.S. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC P OLICY (1983); John M. Kline, Continuing Controversies over State and Local Foreign Policy Sanctions in the United States, 29 P UBLIUS 111,
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on occasion – most notably, in Zschernig v. Miller14 – a court would
conclude that a particular state activity interfered intolerably with federal prerogatives. A strong case might be made for the unconstitutionality of the Massachusetts legislation under this standard, though Zschernig was notoriously unclear as to whether foreign effects by themselves
were sufficient to resolve a state law's constitutionality.15
A second approach, which I have argued hews more closely to constitutional text, case law, and political practices, considers state and local
activities touching on foreign relations unconstitutional only to the extent that they interfere with the "dormant treaty power"—the Treaty
Clause's implied preemption of state bargaining with foreign powers.16
Under this approach, states are free to declaim on matters of foreign relations, enact Buy American laws, or tax multinationals, regardless of
the hue and cry from foreign nations, so long as they do not conflict
with federal enactments (such as statutes or treaties) or appear contingent in fact upon the behavior of foreign powers. Even state bargaining
is permissible to the extent consistent with the treaty power's externality
and collective action rationales – say, were a state entering into a simple
purchase agreement with a foreign country, or a municipality forging a
sister city relationship – or where Congress or the President deems it
unobjectionable.17 The Massachusetts law, however, would be regarded
as an unconstitutional attempt to treat with the Burmese government,
since maintaining the law was unambiguously contingent on the continuation of the existing government and its repressive policies.18

111 (Spring 1999); Dennis James Palumbo, The States and American Foreign Relations (1960)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with aut hor) (tracing long history
of state activities touching on foreign relations).
14. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968); see also Estate of Kraemer v. Kraemer, 81
Cal. Rptr. 287, 294 (Ct. App. 1969) (holding unconstit utional provisions of the California probate
code that conditioned the inheritance of real property on foreign reciprocity); Bethlehem Steel
Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 806 (Ct. App. 1969) (holding unconstitutional
California's "Buy American" statute primarily because of its potential overseas effects); Sprin gfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 307 (Ill. 1986) (invalidating an Illinois statute excluding South African coins from state tax exemptions available to other foreign
coins).
15. See Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 1143-45.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (conferring the treaty power on the President and the
Senate); id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting states from entering into any treaty, alliance, or confederation); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540 (1840); see also Swaine, Negotiating Federalism ,
supra note 11, passim.
17. This test is spelled out at greater length in Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11,
at 1254-78.
18. See Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 1273. Massachusetts was also engaged in other foreign bargaining. The sponsor of the Massachusetts legislation, Representative
Byron Rushing, reportedly offered to amend the law if the European Union agreed to adopt
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A third, revisionist approach considers permissible all state activities
touching on foreign relations, barring conflict with explicit constitutional prohibitions (such as unambiguous attempts by states to enter into
formal treaties), principles forged in the domestic context (for example,
the dormant Commerce Clause), or preemption by federal enactments.19
Something like this approach was suggested in Barclays Bank PLC v.
Franchise Tax Board,20 which appeared to consider federal legislation
as the only relevant federal authority. 21 Not content to rest on Barclays
Bank, or even to attack the exaggerated pedigree of the federal monopoly orthodoxy, revisionists make important arguments against any dormant foreign relations preemption: first, that the judiciary is illequipped to evaluate state activities based on their foreign-policy effects; second, that Congress, not the courts (or, ordinarily, the President), is entrusted with any residual constitutional responsibility for determining the appropriate responsibilities of the federal and state
governments; and third, that federal enactments, particularly statutes,
suffice to regulate any disruptive state activities. Revisionists find their
approach increasingly commended by globalization, which has further
eroded distinctions between domestic and foreign affairs and the related
assignments of authority to the state and federal governments, as well as
exposed states to the disciplining force of direct retaliation.22
harsher sanctions in exchange, but that gambit was unsuccessful. See Michael Lelyveld, Unprecedented Intervention by EU in Bay State, J. COM., Sept. 25, 1998, at 1A.
Consistent with this approach, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
recently differentiated objections to the application of New York's Human Rights Law to the
Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations on the grounds that it "is a statute of
general application that does not . . . attempt to structure a relationship between New York, its
residents, and any other country." Mukaddam v. Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the
United Nations, 111 F.Supp. 457, 473 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2000).
19. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 860-70 (1997); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 12, passim; Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United
States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO . L. REV. 1395, 1410-24 (1999); A.M. Weisburd, State
Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 20-27 (1995).
20. 512 U.S. 298, 303 (1994) (holding that the Constitution permits application of California's
corporate franchise tax to a multinational banking enterprise).
21. Id. at 329 ("Congress has focused its attention on this issue, but has refrained from exercising its authority to prohibit state-mandated worldwide combined reporting."). Barclays Bank may
also be read as having permitted de facto delegation from Congress to the states. See Swaine,
Negotiating Federalism , supra note 11, at 1277 (citing Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 324-27). Doing so depends on the significance placed on congressional attention, and the ability of Congress
to act informally. But cf. Camps Newfound/Owattona, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
617 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (objecting to "legislation by default") (citing INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983)).
22. This argument is given part icular emphasis by Peter Spiro, who contends that do rmant foreign relations preemption was once sound, but is now – or will shortly be—outmoded. See Peter
J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism , 70 U. COLO . L. REV. 1223, 1226 (1999); Peter J. Spiro,
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Whatever the relative merits of these approaches, the orthodoxy lost
ground to the revisionists in Barclays Bank, and at first blush Crosby
appears to continue that trend. The Court directly addressed the foreign
affairs power and dormant Foreign Commerce Clause issues only in
noting that it was unnecessary to reach them given its conclusion that
the Massachusetts law had been preempted. 23 The Court even declined
to address whether the foreign relations context altered the normal presumption against preemption, having concluded that under any standard
the state law would pose a sufficient obstacle to achieving congressional
objectives.24 The result seems to vindicate the revisionist perception
that positive political enactments – principally legislation – are appropriate measures of the federal (and national) interest, and a sufficient
means of avoiding state interference with it.
In any event, the Court regarded the decisive preemption question as
straightforward. First, by giving the President authority to lift sanctions
upon finding that Burma had made appreciable progress, ban new investment by U.S. persons in the event that matters worsened, and waive
sanctions if they became inconsistent with national security interests,
Congress intended to afford the President "flexible and effective authority over economic sanctions against Burma" – while Massachusetts'
sanctions were immediate and permanent, thereby reducing the President's economic and diplomatic leverage. Second, although Congress
attempted "to steer a middle path" by imposing some sanctions and refraining from others,25 the state law penalized types of business activities and classes of companies that Congress had exempted. Third, while
Congress exhorted the President to take a "comprehensive, multila teral
strategy" toward Burma,26 state law complicated those discussions and
made it difficult for the President "to speak for the nation with one voice
in dealing with other governments."27
The Court's own voice, it would appear, was confined to the subject
of Burma, and there to the issue of preemption – better, some may have
felt, than to have tested the Court's willingness to champion internationalism over the sovereign interests of the American states. But the
New Players on the International Stage, 2 HOFSTRA L. & P OL 'Y SYMP . 19, 20 (1997); P eter J.
Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA . J. INT'L L. 121, 123
(1994).
23. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2294 n. 8 (2000) (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
24. Id. at 2294 n.8.
25. Id. at 2297 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73 (1941)).
26. Id. at 2298 (quoting Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166 (1997)).
27. Id. at 2298.
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Court's preemption analysis revealed constitutional preconceptions as
well, and not all were hostile to federal and international interests.
III. CROSBY AND FOREIGN EFFECTS
Notwithstanding the Justices' quixotic attempts at judicial diplomacy,28 the Rehnquist Court has tended to place little stock in international comity.29 In some cases, like Barclays Bank, the Court has found
foreign protests irrelevant to the construction of federal law;30 in others,
like Breard, it has upheld the rights of states to disregard foreign invo-

28. While on a trip to Brussels in 1998, for example, Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer
indicated that they would be receptive toward employing European Community law. EUR. REP .,
July 11, 1998; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Court to Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 708, 710-11
(1998) (describing interest by Justices O'Connor and Breyer in applying EC law). But on a more
recent foray to the American Bar Association's annual convention, Justice Kennedy responded to
accusations that the Supreme Court ignored European courts—and thereby contributed to the "insularity of the American legal sy stem"—by unabashedly defending insularity, adverting to the
possibility that citing Eur opean decisions might "risk losing the allegiance of the [American]
people." Kennedy noted American jurists' uncertainty as to the precise issues undergirding foreign decisions, profound differences between Europe and the U.S. federal system, and faith that
European decisions would eventually evolve to resemble those of American courts. Tony Mauro,
Supreme Court Justices on the Defensive in London, AM. LAW ., July 31, 2000
<http://www.law.com>.
In practice, in any case, attempts to invoke European law have not been warmly received.
Compare, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (adverting to European Community directives in arguing for consistency with federalism) with
Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 n.11 ("We think such comparative analysis inappropriate . . . . The fact is
that our federalism is not Europe's.").
29. Cf. Detlev F. Vagts, Taking Treaties Less Seriously, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 458 (1998) (describing Court's lack of receptiveness toward international law).
30. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 324-29 (1994) (concluding
that foreign government protests against California tax, reflected in diplomatic notes and threats
of retaliation, were irrelevant where Congress had implicitly permitted tax to be sustained); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993) (refusing to withhold federal jurisdiction over Sherman Act claims on international comity grounds where it was possible to conform both to U.S. and British law, even where U.K. government argued that U.S. antitrust
liability was inconsistent with permissive British insurance scheme); United States v. AlvarezMachain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992) (dismissing significance of objections by foreign governments to the legality of abducting their nationals). Contrast, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 17 (1963) (holding that federal courts had the authority to enjoin the National Labor Relations Board from ordering an election fo r the
representation of foreign seamen aboard vessels under foreign flags, where the Board policy
"aroused vigorous protests from foreign governments and created international problems for our
government"); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 384 (1959) (rejecting place of injury as determinate choice-of-law principle under Jones Act on grounds that "such
a rule does not fit the accommodations that become relevant in fair and prudent regard for the
interests of foreign nations in the regulation of their own ships and their own natio nals, and the
effect upon our interests of our treatment of the legitimate interests of foreign nations").
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cations of international law, and compounded the offense by failing to
defer to the Court's international peers.31
Measured by this standard, Crosby may seem refreshingly sensitive
to foreign concerns. To be sure, the Court's preemption analysis contrasted uncomfortably with more limited concern for conflict in the international setting. Justice Souter's majority opinion in Hartford Fire
employed a narrow and unorthodox interpretation of the "true conflicts"
warranting consideration of international comity, which he considered
was not even implicated "'where a person subject to regulation by two
states can comply with the laws of both.'"32 In Crosby, in striking contrast, Justice Souter observed that "the fact that some companies may be
able to comply with both sets of sanctions does not mean that the state
Act is not at odds with achievement of the federal decision about the
right degree of pressure to employ,"33 and found "imminent" conflict
"when 'two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity.'"34 The unmistakable impression was that courts should guard zealously against conflicts with national regulatory objectives, but that the
same degree of tension with regulations enforced by the federal government's foreign counterparts would not even present an issue worth
considering.
Yet in evaluating whether the Massachusetts law conflicted with the
President's statutory assignment to develop a comprehensive multila teral strategy, the Court attached weight to protests filed with the State
Department by Japan, the European Union, and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and further emphasized the formal
complaints by the EU and Japan before the WTO. To the Court, these
disputes, coupled with the opinion of executive branch officials, were
"competent and direct evidence of the frustration of congressional objectives by the state Act," at least where Congress had not specifically
31. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); see Jonathan Charney & W. Michael Reisman,
Agora: Breard: The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 666 et seq. (1998); see also Federal Republic of
Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1999) (per curiam) (declining to entertain motions by German government for leave to file a bill of complaint and for preliminary injunction
against the United States and the governor of Arizona, seeking to enforce ex parte order by the
International Court of Justice to prevent scheduled execution of state prisoner). But cf. Zschernig
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1968) (holding unconstitutional an Oregon statute having "more
than 'some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries'" and "great potential for disruption or
embarrassment" exceeding that "of a diplomatic bagatelle") (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S.
503, 517 (1947)).
32. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 799 (quoting RESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 cmt. e).
33. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2298 (2000).
34. Id. at 2298 (quoting Wisconsin Dep't of Industry v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986)
(quoting Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485, 498-99 (1953))).
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disregarded them. 35 Where Congress was of a diplomatic bent, then, it
licensed the Court itself to show greater respect for foreign governments, and international tribunals, than had recently been its practice.
The Court's attempt to attribute its shift to Congress is somewhat misleading, and merits comment. Crosby derived the imperative of multilateralism from section 570(c) of the federal act, which directed the
President to "seek to develop . . . a comprehensive, multilateral strategy" toward Burma, "in coordination with members of ASEAN and
other countries having major trading and investment interests in
Burma," including the aim of promoting "a dialogue between the State
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and democratic opposition groups within Burma."36 But the statute's political antecedents and
overall approach suggest that multila teralism was less fundamental to its
operation, and certainly less preclusive, than the Court surmised. The
Clinton administration and Congress finally agreed to act largely out of
a perception that multilateral efforts had already failed, leaving little
downside to more forward American initiatives.37 Certainly Congress's
decision to impose sanctions before the President would have any
chance to lift them, let alone to pursue his charge under § 570(c), suggests that it perceived no inherent conflict between an initial salvo of
sanctions and a multilateral strategy – or, one might have surmised, between preexisting state sanctions and a multila teral strategy. 38

35. Id. at 2301.
36. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, 110 Stat 3009, 167-168.
37. See EU Fails to Impose Sanctions on Burma, EUR. REP ., July 17, 1996; Michael Richardson, U.S. Steps Up Pressure as Burma Holds Its Ground, I NT'L HERALD T RIBUNE, July 24, 1996
(noting continuing resistance by ASEAN countries to U.S. campaign for sanctions); Wayne
Woodlief, Burma Bill May Gain Votes for Weld, BOSTON HERALD , June 13, 1996, at 35 (report ing that Senator Kerry supported pursuit by Clinton administration of multilateral approach, but
would within weeks support congressional legislation in the event that continued to fail).
In its support of congressional legislation, which the Court duly cited, 120 S. Ct. at 2295 n.9,
the executive branch did not emphasize its multilateral aspects, but instead described it as compatible with the administration's existing unilateral measures. See 142 CONG . REC. 19219 (1996)
(letter from Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, to Senator William Cohen). Officials also characterized the congressionally imposed sanctions as unilateral.
See Lott Bipartisan Task Force on Sanctions
(Sept. 8, 1998) (testimony of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for Economic and
Business and Agricultural Affairs)
<http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/
980908_eizen_sanctions.htm>; Stuart E. Eizenstat, Sanctions: Mend'Em, Don't End'Em, Letter to
the Editor, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1999, at 154 [hereinafter Eizenstat, Letter to the Editor]; see
also infra note 41.
38. This point was sufficient to convince the district court to reject the preemption claim. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 293 (D. Mass. 1998) ("This [preemption] argument is not persuasive, because the federal statute actually provides for unilateral sanctions against Myanmar."), aff'd sub nom. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38
(1st Cir. 1999), aff'd sub nom. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000).
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In any event, the President's ability "to devise a comprehensive, multilateral strategy"39 seems reasonably distinct from whether foreign governments abreacted to the Massachusetts law, just as one might separate
the character of the congressional initiative from how its after-the-fact
multilateralism was received abroad. Quelling foreign concerns about
the U.S. approach(es) can simply be part of multilateral discussions, just
as accepting accolades for the U.S. strategy might be – and certainly
bracing for foreign complaints can be part of the President's development of a multilateral approach. To be sure, it would be relatively difficult for the President to override unpreempted state sanctions, given the
lack of a waiver provision comparable to that in the federal scheme.40
But perhaps Congress anticipated that further legislation might be necessary to advance its cause and the contrary supposition, that multilateralism consists of persuading others to follow an unalterable U.S. template, would certainly have diminished the Court's concerns.41
One may also question Crosby's fidelity to congressional intent in its
appreciation of which foreign voices were relevant to multilateralism –
which, in other words, belonged to the Court's "international community."42 The Court understandably downplayed the adverse reactions of
Burma and the other ASEAN countries to the state sanctions,43 rather
39. Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2300.
40. Having said that, the heightened need for Congress to afford the President authority to
waive federal sanctions – for which he would otherwise have to rely on the thinnest of inherent
authority, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) – might also explain its relatively cavalier approach to state sanctions, which it
might have anticipated could be more easily trumped by the President in the event they interfered.
41. U.S. officials recognized that foreign simulation of the U.S. approach would not be multilateral in the ordinary sense. See Subcomm. On Trade of the House Committee on Ways and
Means (Oct. 23, 1997) (testimony of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for Economic,
Business, and Agricultural Affairs) <http://www.house.gov/ ways_means/trade/105cong/10-2397/1023eize.htm> [hereinafter Eizenstat, Testimony (Oct. 23, 1997)] (citing federal sanctions on
Burma as an "example[] of unilateral sanctions which have been effective or which have served
as an encouragement to others to take action."); Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for
Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, and Rick Newcomb, Director, Office of Foreign
Assets Control, Treasury Department, Press Briefing on Economic Sanctions (Apr. 28, 1999)
<http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/9990428_eizenstat_sanctions.htm>
(citing
Burma as example of "where we have unilateral sanctions but that in turn encouraged the Eur opean Union to impose its own unilateral sanctions, even though they're multilateral in the sense of
being under UN auspices"). That is not to say, however, that multilateral efforts, or even the
principle of multilateralism, are strictly inconsistent with this sort of hegemony. See, e.g., AnneMarie Burley, Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of
the New Deal Regulatory State, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: T HE T HEORY AND P RAXIS OF
AN I NSTITUTIONAL FORM 125 (John Gerard Ruggie ed., 1993).
42. Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2298.
43. But see id. at 2298 (citing congressional call to cooperate with "members of ASEAN and
other countries"); id. at 2299 (citing weakening of President "not only in dealing with the Burmese regime"); id. at 2299 (citin g, among others, diplomatic protests of ASEAN).
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than privileging the most ironic form of "heckler's veto."44 But Congress also expressly called for encouraging a dialogue between the
Burmese government and its opposition, and that opposition was widely
understood to favor all measures for discouraging foreign investment –
including, presumably, state sanctions.45 Other voices in the international community, moreover, regarded the Massachusetts law favorably
– including the European Parliament (which opposed the Commission's
decision to commence WTO proceedings)46 and a wide range of nongovernmental organizations 47 – and the executive branch seemed to
consider such players to be part of the relevant international community,48 yet they were of no interest to the Court.
The Court's distinctive appreciation of multilateralism is more than
just an imperfect exercise in statutory construction. To a degree, the
decision validates revisionist doubts about constitutional tests entailing
similar judicial inquiries into foreign effects,49 doubts which I tend to
share.50 But doing away with judicial review is not the only answer. By
presuming interference with federal treaty functions for certain types of
state activities, the dormant treaty power principle would also obviate
the need to take the pulse of foreign governments; within this paradigm,
indeed, foreign wailing and gnashing is assumed to be entirely consis-

44. Cf. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 18, Barclays
Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (Nos. 92-1384 & 92-1839) ("Threats of
retaliation by foreign governments, however, cannot be sufficient in themselves to render a state
tax invalid. Such a legal rule would in essence give foreign governments a 'heckler's veto' over
state taxing authorities.").
45. Aung San Suu Kyi, a leader of Burmese opposition and a Nobel laureate, explicitly supported economic sanctions without apparent concern for the level of government involved. See,
e.g., Burmese Dissident Urges Western Sanctions to Oust Military, N.Y. T IMES, July 19, 1996, at
A4.
46. See European Parliament, Resolution of Sept. 17, 1998 (Nos. B4 -0820, 0825, 0832 and
0849/98), 1998 O.J. (C 313) 181, ¶ 4 ("[c]riticis[ing] . . . the Commission decision to insist on a
conflict resolution panel within WTO over the law of the US State of Massachusetts, which set a
pricing penalty on purchases of goods by state authorities from companies that do business with
Burma"). Within the Community legal order, however, the Commission, subject to the agreement
of the Council of Ministers, was wholly competent to commence those proceedings, and parliamentary opinion was formally irrelevant. Council Regulation 3286/94 of 22 December 1994
Laying Down Community Procedures in the Field of the Co mmon Commercial Policy, 1994 O.J.
(L 349) 71.
47. Supporters included the AFL-CIO, the International Labor Rights Fund, and a wide variety
of international and domestic environmental and consumer groups, in addition to purely domestic
interests – not to mention a number of states and localities. See Harrison Institute for Public Law,
Georgetown University Law Center, Support for Massachusetts on Appeal of the Burma Law
Decision (Feb. 18, 1999) (on file with author).
48. See infra note 77.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
50. See Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 1150-61.
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tent with the President's exercise of constitutional prerogatives in the
national interest.51
Crosby's emphasis on multilateralism is also consistent with the dormant treaty power in less obvious ways. State diplomacy is problematic
not just because of its potential for interfering with the President's preferred multilateral tack (which, after all, the states may simulate or even
assist, as Massachusetts contended),52 but also because the states are
themselves incapable of comprehensive multilateralism: by and large,
they still lack the international standing to participate in most multila teral discourse and to resolve differences through binding international
agreements.53 Their participation, in consequence, is much more likely
to be unilateral, coercive, and antagonistic. As explained in the next
section, the Court's emphasis on multilateral interactions solely with
"foreign powers," classically understood, rather than the full range of
parties participating in modern international affairs, bespeaks a constitutional solicitude toward the President's constitutional authority over
formal foreign relations.
IV. CROSBY AND EXECUTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The majority opinion in Crosby cited foreign protests not for their
own sake, but as relevant to the President's ability to discharge his statutory duties,54 and toward that end emphasized executive branch statements that the Massachusetts law "has complicated its dealings with
foreign sovereigns and proven an impediment to accomplishing the objectives assigned by Congress."55 In Barclays Bank, the Court had
given such representations the back of its hand. But Crosby distinguished that as an instance in which Congress had "taken specific actions rejecting the positions both of foreign governments . . . and the
Executive" by failing to outlaw controversial state tax practices.56

51. Cf. William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict of Laws Theory: An Argument for
Judicial Unilateralism , 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101, 152-67 (1998) (arguing that unilateralism may
induce foreign cooperation).
52. See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2298 (2000).
53. See RESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201
cmt. g & note 9 (1987). In February 1998, a State Department observer attended consultations
between EU, United Kingdom, and Massachusetts officials, but the EU was at pains to characterize the meetings as something other than negotiations. See Robert S. Greenberger, States, Cities
Increase Use of Trade Sanctions, Troubling Business Groups and U.S. Partners, W ALL ST. J.,
Apr. 1, 1998, at A20.
54. Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2299-2301.
55. Id. at 2300.
56. Id. at 2300-01 (citing Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 324-29
(1994)).
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As previously noted, Crosby professed to avoid any constitutional basis for its decision, other than the Supremacy Clause. But in two of
three bases the Court proffered for preemption, it went out of its way to
explain that the power at stake was constitutional, and presidential, in
origin. In discussing the tension between the rigid Massachusetts law
and the federal act's flexibility, for example, the Court invoked not only
Justice Jackson's view that a President's authority is greatest when congressional delegation supplements "all that he possesses in his own
right,"57 but also Jackson's observation that "the President's power in the
area of foreign relations is least restricted by Congress"58 – and further
cited Curtiss-Wright, the bête noire of those defending congressional
prerogatives.59
The constitutional component to the multilateralism argument was
still clearer. In stressing that "Congress's express command to the
President to take the initiative for the United States among the international community invested him with the maximum authority of the National Government,"60 the Court also noted that such authority was "in
harmony with the President's own constitutional powers," citing the
treaty power and the powers to appoint and receive ambassadors.61 The
Court further invoked the President's constitutional authority in alluding
to Dames & Moore v. Regan, which bespoke a healthy respect for the
President's authority to settle claims,62 and in referring to the "foreign
powers" that are the objects of the treaty power.63 The Court even acknowledged, it seemed, that Congress's mandate for multilateralism
provided the President with no authority (and, for that matter, no enforceable constraint) other than that already conferred by the Constitu-

57. Id. at 2295 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
58. Id. (citing Youngstown , 343 U.S. at 635–36 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring), and United States
v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936)).
59. Id. (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304).
60. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2298 (2000) (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
61. Id. at 2298 (citing U.S. CONST., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties" and "shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls"); § 3 ("[The President] shall receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers")).
62. Id. at 2296 (citing Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. 654, 673-74 (1981)). In Dames & Moore, to
be sure, the President employed blocking orders afforded by Congress, see 453 U.S. at 673-74,
but the Court also relied on congressional acquiescence in a (possibly) independent presidential
authority to settle claims, id. at 678-83, 688, notwithstanding contrary indications in IEEPA and
other statutory schemes.
63. See supra section II; Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2301 (citing "statements of foreign powers").
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tion, observing that the federal act was both a "clear mandate" and an
"invocation of exclusive national power."64
The difficulty lies in assessing when that exclusive national power, be
it statutory or otherwise, has been frustrated – which in turn involves the
delicate question of how to square judicial intervention with respect for
the relevant political branches. In this regard, too, the Court was more
accommodating of the executive branch than was previously its practice.65 Although the Court dutifully acknowledged both congressional
and executive-branch competence on foreign policy,66 Crosby was relatively respectful of the President's role – certainly as compared to Barclays Bank, which dismissed executive-branch objections to California's
tax as irrelevant once Congress, "the preeminent speaker," had passed
within shouting distance.67 The Court differentiated between the legal
judgments of the executive, to which it would not "unquestionably" defer on preemption questions, and the practical assessment by officials of
real-world difficulties occasioned by the state law. As to the la tter, the
Court confessed, the judiciary is far less competent than the political
branches to "determin[e] precisely when foreign nations will be offended by particular acts"68 or to perceive the "nuances" of U.S. foreign
policy.69 The resulting deference to the executive branch was not only
more generous than in Barclays Bank, but also exceeded that in Zschernig v. Miller, where the Court essentially decided to evaluate foreign
policy by itself.70
The trick with deference, of course, lies in knowing when to stop,
particularly given its predicate that judges are inexpert at assessing the
relevant evidence. Crosby winds up being a cautionary tale. Consistent
with its minimalist approach, the Court provided little guidance on the
sorts of evidence that might substantiate a conflict, besides concluding
that "[i]n this case, repeated representations by the executive branch
supported by formal diplomatic protests and concrete disputes are more
than sufficient" to demonstrate interference with congressional obje c-

64. Id. at 2298 (emphasis added).
65. See Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 1154-56 (discussing lack of deference to executive branch in existing case law).
66. Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2301 (quoting Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board,
463 U.S. 159, 196 (1983), and Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 289, 327
(1994)).
67. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 329; see infra text accompanying note 96 (describing how
Congress's endorsement of California tax, and rejection of executive-branch objections, was inferred by Court, and contrasting Crosby).
68. Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2301 (quoting Container Corp. of America, 463 U.S. at 194).
69. Id. at 2301 (quoting Container Corp. of America, 463 U.S. at 196).
70. 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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tives.71 The most tangible effect was the WTO proceedings initiated by
the EU and Japan, which the Court observed had "embroil[ed] the National Government for some time now."72
The Court properly avoided prejudging the merits of the WTO proceedings,73 but was then left with the difficult task of translating diffuse
evidence of political conflict into something legally relevant; in attempting to do so, it ignored evidence suggesting a considerably more nuanced (if not Janus-faced) official position on the Massachusetts law
and its legality. The United States was not, after all, legally bound to
defend Massachusetts before the WTO74 – particularly not if it perceived that the state was violating federal law as well – and it initially
declined to take any clear position,75 beyond cautioning the EU to let it
first deal with the matter internally.76 When this failed, however, the
U.S. Trade Representative not only expressed "regret" at the WTO consultations, but also flung back the European Parliament's opposition to
WTO proceedings and Member State encouragement of similar state
sanctions.77 The Secretary of State also reported that she and the President "recognize[d] the authority of state and local officials to determine
their own investment and procurement policies, and the right – indeed
their responsibility – to take moral considerations into account as they
do so."78 These officials indicated that states and localities might work
71. Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2301.
72. Id. at 2300.
73. See id. at 2299 & n.19.
74. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, §
102(b)(1)(C)(iii) (1994), codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(C). The U.S. Trade Representative is, however, required to consult with the state concerning the dispute.
75. WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review: United States, Addendum to the
Minutes of the Nov. 11-12, 1996 meeting, WT/TPR/M/16/Add.1 (97-1119), (Mar. 19, 1997)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html> (stating, in response to question from European
Community, that "[w]e have been consulting with state officials about the law and its implementation. We are also considering the extent to which the law is consistent with the requirements of
the GPA [Government Procurement Agency].").
76. See Nancy Dunne, Massachsetts' Burma Law Row Flares, FIN. T IMES, June 14, 1997, at 4
(quoting June 5, 1997, letter from U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky to Sir Leon
Brittan, EU Trade Commissioner, arguing that "[i]nitiating WTO dispute settlement proceedings
at this time . . . would frustrate our efforts in Massachusetts to reach a satisfactory conclusion").
77. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Press Release 97-58 (June 20, 1997)
<http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1997/06/97-58.pdf>; see also Rita Hayes, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Representative to the World Trade Organization in Geneva, U.S. Statement on
Massachusetts Burma Law, USIS W ASHINGTON FILE , (Oct. 20, 1998) <http://www.usisaustralia.gov/hyper/WF981021/epf303.htm> (citing support for Massachusetts' position from the
European Parliament and the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General
Workers' Unions).
78. Letter from Madeline Albright, Secretary of State, to Colleagues and Friends, (Apr. 17,
1998), Joint Appendix at 196-97, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288
(2000) (No. 99-474); see also Eizenstat, Testimony (Oct. 23, 1997), supra note 41 ("We are work-
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together with the executive branch to ensure coordinated and lawful
policies, and predicted that all concerned, including Massachusetts,
could "reach a mutually satisfactory resolution."79 Prior to September
1998, when the EU finally elected to ask for a dispute resolution panel,
it was not clear whether it would press the matter, or what the U.S. reaction would be.80
Unless one dismisses this all as posturing (and assumes that it were
possible to discern a more accurate account), it raises a credible argument that foreign conflicts were not an inevitable byproduct of the Massachusetts law, but were instead the result of a U.S. decision to take up
the state's defense – perhaps based on a belief that Massachusetts was
within its rights – and overreactions by Europe and Japan. 81 In any
event, these were not the sounds of officials convinced that Massachusetts was undermining a congressionally dictated objective, and few if
any of the statements cited by the Court support that proposition either.82 Crosby suggested that the Solicitor General "continue[d] to advance" the theory that state sanctions conflicted with congressional
objectives,83 but that theory was still nascent, and it was even unclear up
until the merits stage in the Supreme Court whether the United States
would side with or against Massachusetts.84
ing with Massachusetts, and with other state and local governments which have implemented or
are considering the imposition of various sanctions measures, to try to ensure that they are designed so that they do not conflict with our international obligations and work to advance rather
than retard progress toward meeting our foreign policy objectives.”).
79. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 77. Secretary of State Albright,
speaking more generally, urged state and localities to work "in partnership" with the State Department to ensure compliance with international obligations and to maintain a consistent voice in
foreign policy. Albright, supra note 77.
80. See Michael S. Lelyveld, U.S. Vows to Defend Sanctions by State, J. COM., Sept. 11, 1998,
at 3A; see also Michael S. Lelyveld, Anti-Sanctions Forces Win Key Vote, J. COM., Aug. 1, 1998,
at 1A (noting failure of House bill designed to protect Massachusetts from suit to enforce WTO
panel decisions, and noting uncertainty surrounding whether the federal government would seek
to force compliance by Massachusetts, despite pledges by U.S.T.R. spokesperson that the federal
government would defend Massachusetts before the WTO).
81. Drawing such a distinction would, of course, be fraught with peril: not only would it be
difficult for courts to distinguish between genuine and manufactured executive branch expressions, but any such distinction would risk privileging unexamined foreign reactions. See supra
text accompanying note 44 (describing problem of the "heckler's veto").
82. The only remarks directly alluding to the federal statute opined that the Massachusetts law
was "very different." See Alan P. Larson, Assistant Secretary of State, State and Local Sanctions:
Remarks to the Council of State Governments (Dec. 8, 1998) (on file with author). It is notewo rthy that those remarks were delivered over six months after the initiation of the lawsuit against
Massachusetts, and that over a year passed before the executive branch officials again took that
position. See also infra note 87 (describing other executive branch testimony).
83. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2300 & n. 22 (2000).
84. Michael S. Lelyveld, Clinton Refrains from Intervening in Myanmar Case, J. COM., Mar.
11, 1999, at 3A; see also Fred Hiatt, Boston's Stand on Human Rights, W ASH . P OST, Aug. 25,
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The Court's reductionist appraisal of this hubbub is again supportive
in some respects of foreign-relations revisionism. Revisionists are
skeptical not only of the quality of judicial judgments in their own right,
but also of the legitimacy and authority of the executive branch guidance submitted to them. 85 The Burma controversy also casts further
doubt on any orthodox fiction that the federal government could, even
left to its own devices, manage to maintain "one voice" in foreign affairs. The diversity of subjects, actors, and interests in modern global
affairs means that even "sovereign" actors need to maintain multiple
(and sometimes conflicting) networks and dialogues, particularly where
domestic and international law point in different directions.86 Deciding
when to insist on a single voice, it may be argued, is a task best left to
Congress.
But if Crosby is troubling for the administration of any "one voice"
orthodoxy, it almost equally bedevils any revisionist preference for
statutory analysis. The Court's difficulties in Crosby, after all, lay in
evaluating alleged conflicts between state activities and congressional
(not constitutional) objectives, and there is no reason to think that such
inquiries are ordinarily any easier in kind. The two may in fact be difficult to distinguish: the President's actual obje ctives in any particular
situation are invariably independent to some degree of congressional
stipulation – a host of solutions, for example, might be both multilateral
and generally conducive to Burmese democracy and human rights – and
even Congress likely expects that pursuit of those objectives will accord
with the President's broader constitutional responsibility for promoting
the national interest. In Crosby itself, the senior executive officials
cited by the Court made little or no mention of statutory objectives, but
instead tended to couch their objections to state interference in terms of
conflict with the President's constitutional responsibility for foreign policy. To the extent these objections implicated the Supremacy Clause,
they related to the potential for violating international, not domestic, enactments.87

1997, at A19; Michael S. Lelyveld, U.S. May Defend, Oppose State's Sanctions Law, J. COM.,
Feb. 3, 1999, at 3A; Dierdre Shesgreen, Can States Set Trade Policy?, LEGAL T IMES, Aug. 17,
1998, at 4. For criticism of the U.S. reluctance to intervene, see Edward T. Swaine, The Triumph
of Local Politics?, 93 AM. SOC'Y I NT'L L. P ROC. 247, 248 (1999).
85. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 1709-10.
86. See Curtis Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism , 97 MICH . L. REV. 390,
446 (1997); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 1688; Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real
New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 183.
87. See Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2300 & nn.21, 22 (citing authority). The testimony of thenUnder Secretary of State Eizenstat cautioned that "[i]t is the Executive Branch of the U.S.
Government which is charged with conducting the nation's foreign policy, in consultation
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Following the revisionists in deferring almost exclusively to Congress would also be inconsistent with Crosby's apparent respect for executive authority. While purposefully stopping short of delimiting state
authority respecting foreign affairs, the Court also deliberately transcended the statutory mission designated by Congress by invoking "the
very capacity of the President to speak with one voice in dealing with
other governments."88 To the Court, it was self-evident that "the President's maximum power to persuade rests on his capacity to bargain for
the benefits of access to the entire national economy without exception
for enclaves fenced off willy-nilly by inconsistent political tactics."89
Congress clearly possessed the authority to eliminate any such enclave,90 but the Court considered it equally beyond controversy that the
mere ability to override state law did not suffice to protect the exclusive
national power.

with the U.S. Congress, not states and municipalities. We sh ould have only one foreign policy at a time.” Eizenstat, Testimony (Oct. 23, 1997), supra note 41. See also Role of Sanctions in U.S. National Security Policy: Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm.
(July 1, 1999) (testimony of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for Economic,
Business,
and
Agricultural
Affairs)
<http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990701_eizen_sanctions.html>
(explaining that the authority of state and local governments to impose economic sanctions "is ult imately an issue for the court to decide . . . [b]ut again, we think it has to be exercised within
the context of the ultimate constitutional responsibility of the executive branch and of the
United States to exercise foreign policy"); Hearing Before the Cal. Assembly Comm. on Int'l
Trade and Dev., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. 9 (Oct. 28, 1997), Joint Appendix at 131, 135-37,
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99-474) (statement
of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Marchick arguing that state and local sanctions
measures "can impede the President's and Secretary of State's conduct of foreign policy,"
create conflict with allies, and violate international treaties and agreements, and citing and
WTO action relating to Burma as having distracted U.S. and European attention from focusing on Burma itself); Maryland House of Delegates, Comm. on Commerce and Government
Matters (March 25, 1998) (testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David
Marchick), Joint Appendix at 160, 164-66, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120
S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99-474); accord Eizenstat, Letter to the Editor, supra note 37, at
155 (citing Clinton Administration concern with state sanctions, and noting that "although
Congress clearly has a role to play, the President is the sole custodian of the implementation
of foreign policy and must be given the opportunity to speak for the nation as a whole").
This potential for confusion surely undermines the Court's attempt to differentiate between deference to executive branch officials on legal questions, which the Court would not "unque stio ningly" extend, and those officials' "competence to show the practical difficulty of pursuing a congressional goal requiring multinational agreement." Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2301. Evidence of
conflict or encroachment will tend to be predicated upon an underlying theory of entitlement.
Unless executive branch testimony is highly specific, and properly interpreted, deferring on a
question of practical impact may in volve accepting a particular legal theory as well.
88. Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2298.
89. Id. at 2299.
90. Id. at 2294 n.7 ("The State concedes, as it must, that in addr essing the subject of the federal Act, Congress has the power to preempt the state statute.").
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Finally, revisionism is hardly the only solution. A narrower constitutional principle, like the dormant treaty power, might presumptively
proscribe certain state conduct without requiring executive submission
or other specific protest, instead relying on a backdrop of executivebranch constitutional authority. Such a principle, likewise, does not depend on the fiction that one voice can be maintained in all matters of
foreign affairs, but instead insists that only one authority – the President
– engage in the more defined role of bargaining with foreign powers.
Insisting on the pertinence of executive authority is not, it turns out,
as radical as it may seem. Those favoring the orthodox federal monopoly, or the narrower prohibition on state bargaining with foreign powers, ordinarily concede Congress's general authority to license state foreign-relations activities, just like it may consent to foreign compacts or
agreements other than treaties.91 The constitutional question, instead, is
what rules ought govern in the absence of congressional intervention: a
constitutional prohibition, given executive-branch prerogatives, or a
more permissive approach, one respecting the presumptive authority of
state governments. When Congress does act, as it did toward Burma,
the answer to this constitutional question remains pertinent, informing
how the judiciary approaches the statute – and, as Crosby cautions, how
Congress regards the judic iary.
V.

CROSBY AND CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR FEDERAL
AFFAIRS

This constitutional subtext to Crosby – its extra-statutory solicitude
for formal diplomatic interaction with foreign powers, and for the President's presumptively exclusive ability to engage in it – is, after all, only
subtext: the Court's explicit basis for decision was statutory, and so limited to the Burma legislation. Even so, Crosby's approach to statutory
construction may have profound implications for the future of state foreign-relations conduct. Here, too, the Court disclaimed any interest in
painting with broad strokes. Contrasting its decision earlier in the term
in United States v. Locke, which held that the normal presumption
against preemption was inappropriate in matters of national and international maritime commerce,92 the Court held that the clarity of the conflict between the Massachusetts and federal legislation allowed it to
91. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting states from "enter[ing] into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation"); id. art . I, § 10, cl. 1 (allowing states to enter into an "Agreement or
Compact" with a foreign power, if so permitted by Congress). There are limits to this authority,
of course, but they may pose no more of a constraint than those on any assertion of authority by
Congress – for example, its inability to nominate and appoint ambassadors on its own behalf.
92. 120 S. Ct. 1135, 1147-48 (2000).
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"leave for another day a consideration in this context of a presumption
against preemption."93
The Court's coyness preserves its right to upset some future statutory
scheme based on a hitherto undisclosed ground rule. But Crosby also
contains seeds of two biases that may signal difficulty for states interested in foreign affairs. The first, already forecast, may be an inclination to read statutes as consistent with executive branch constitutional
prerogatives, such as the unfettered authority to negotiate with foreign
powers on the nation's behalf.94 The precise scope of any such presumption, not a complete stranger to foreign affairs,95 may now to have
to await a purely constitutional decision, and then another statutory matter in its wake, to the eventual surprise of both Congress and the states.
The Court's treatment of legislative history may also have effected a
kind of presumption. The Court summarily rejected Massachusetts' argument that Congress's failure expressly to preempt its law demonstrated implicit permission, stressing that Congress may have been relying on the courts to detect and resolve any inconsistency between
federal and state law.96 This agnosticism is deeply at odds with Barclays Bank, which concluded that silence in the face of discrepant state
law connoted congressional acceptance (and, correspondingly, rejection
of foreign and executive branch objections).97 Equally striking, as Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence, the majority's view that "the silence
of Congress may be ambiguous" was inconsistent with its argument that
Congress's failure to enact variant schemes resembling the Massachusetts law meant that state law was preempted. 98 The result, all told, is
93. Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2294 n.8.
94. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979) (describing
McCulloch as "declin[ing] to read the National Labor Relations Act so as to give rise to a serious
question of separation of powers which in turn would have implicated sensitive issues of the authority of the Executive over relations with foreign nations") (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963)).
95. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND . L. REV. 593, 606, 617 (1992) (citing, for
example, Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221 (1986)).
96. Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2302.
97. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 329 (1994). The Court's answer
did not contrast (as it could have) the relatively thin evidence of congressional consideration as
compared to Barclays Bank.
98. Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2303 (Scalia, J., concurring); compare id. at 2302 (noting ambiguity
of congressional silence), with id. at 2296 n.11, 2297 n.13, 2301 n.23 (discussing legislative history). Justice Scalia did not go so far, however, as to endorse the approach he thought the Court
had betrayed. Cf. Johnson v. Santa Clara, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that congressional inaction may result from any number of reasons: "(1) approval of the
status quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to alter the status quo, (3) unawareness
of the status quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, or even (5) political cowardice").
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one to inspire caution. Crosby has been read as encouraging lobbyists
for the states and human rights to focus on securing exemptions from
federal sanctions legislation. 99 Should their efforts fall short, however,
Crosby also suggests that the fact of that failure may be cited against
them and in favor of preemption.
A de facto presumption of preemption would accomplish some part
of what a constitutionally-premised bar on state diplomacy might, by
encouraging the collective, national formulation of foreign policy, even
as to the desirability of exemptions for state policies. Yet a preemptionbased analysis, shorn of a clearer constitutional premise, would have a
distinctive side effect. Executive branch officials, and an increasing
proportion of Congress, have come to agree with America's trading
partners that its penchant for unilateral sanctions is often counterproductive. Sanctions often have an extraterritorial effect on parties other than
the target, and when they do not, may simply permit investment substitution from other countries lacking in restrictions. Multilateral support,
in consequence, is increasingly seen as a prerequisite for American
sanctions.100
Left to its statutory basis, Crosby perversely invites the opposite
strategy. If Congress desires to maintain federal control of a particular
topic for foreign diplomacy, it is asked to choose between establishing
an affirmative, identifiable federal policy with preemptive effect, on the
one hand, and the rarely palatable option of passing legislation with the
sole purpose of snuffing out state activities, on the other.101 One may
regard the core of this dilemma, the idea that the federal government
must make policy in order to prevent state policy-making, as one of
those conundrums routine to a federal society, at least in one in which

99. See Morning Edition, supra note 3 ("[I]n the future, when questions of human rights arise
in Congress, state and local governments will be asking Congress to include some kind of savings
clause in legislation that would permit state and local governments to continue to act in this
way"); Goldberg, supra note 9; Greenhouse, supra note 6.
100. See, e.g., Richard N. Haas, Conclusion: Lessons and Recommendations, in ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 197-211 (Richard N. Haas ed., 1998) (concluding that
"[u]nilateral sanctions are rarely effective" and that multilateral support should normally be regarded as a prerequisite, and that "[s]anctions fatigue" may diminish marginal effectiveness of
both unilateral and multilateral sanctions); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means (May 27, 1999) (stat ement of Sidney Weintraub)
<http://www.csis.org/hill/ts990527.html>; David R. Moran, No Panacea: Analyzing Sanctions
Before Imposition, 27 STETSON L. REV. 1403 (1998) (cit ing studies). But see Jesse Helms, What
Sanctions Epidemic?, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 2 (arguing that unilateral sanctions are
both sparingly used and effective).
101. This is likely to be particularly unappealing when the states are championing human
rights, even if the federal government perceives that there may be better, if inchoate, means of
promoting them. See Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 1246-54 & n.433.

SWAINEREVISED.DOC

2001]

1/31/01 4:50 PM

CROSBY AS FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

123

the judiciary minds its own business. It gives pause, however, to consider the serious impact this has on the possibilities for multilateralism,
the apparent obje ctive behind the legislation at issue in Crosby itself. If
Congress is routinely forced to choose between establishing a federal
program, solely barring state policies, and tolerating state interference,
it may find it impossible to achieve the state of repose most conducive
to international policy coordination. Securing that state of repose, I argue in the final section, requires the Court's own construction of the
Constitution.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE CONSTITUTION AS A LAST RESORT
Crosby's crux lies not in its reading of the federal Burma law or its
approach to preemption, but rather in its prudential approach to rendering decisions – evidenced by its terse invocation of Justice Brandeis's
famous caution in Ashwander v. TVA against unnecessarily resolving
constitutional questions.102 The reasons for electing this approach deserved greater elaboration. 103 The most common rationale involves the
respect owed by courts to the coordinate branches, particularly in the
corollary that courts should construe a statute so as to avoid potential
conflict with the Constitution. 104 That corollary itself is plainly inapposite in Crosby – given that the propriety of the federal statute was not in

102. See Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2294 n. 8 (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). The Court's citation suggests that it intended the ge neral principle, but the most pertinent of the many rules catalogued by Brandeis was t hat as between two
possible grounds for decision, courts should prefer the non-constitutional ground. Ashwander,
297 U.S. at 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds,
one involving a constitutional question, the other a que stion of statutory construction or general
law, the Court will decide only the latter").
103. It is clear from Justice Brandeis's opinion that he viewed the doctrine as a prude ntial one,
not one dictated by the Constitution, see Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The
Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 605, 648-49 (1992), a view consistent with its subsequent application. See id.; see, e.g., Escambia County, Florida v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51
(1984) (per curiam) ("[N]ormally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is
some other ground upon which to dispose of the case"). But see, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1993) (Blackmun, J. , dissenting) (describing principle as a
"'corollary' to the Article III case or controversy requirement . . . grounded in basic principles regarding the institution of judicial review and this Court's proper role in our federal system")
(quoting Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 570 (1947)).
104. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) ("This canon is followed out of respect for
Congress, which we assume legislates in light of constitutional limitations."); accord id. at 22324 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (given that members of Congress are bound by and
swear an oath to the Constitution, the Court will not "lightly assume that Congress intended to
infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it"). But
see, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP . CT. REV. 71 (criticizing Ashwander
approach to statutory construction as no less intrusive than judicial review of constitutionality).
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question105 – and respect for Congress seems only remotely relevant to
any more general notion of constitutional avoidance. Avoiding deciding on the basis of a constitutional ground that is facially consistent with
a federal legislative scheme involves little in the way of deference,
unless one imagines that the political branches insist on top billing for
their efforts.106
Avoidance is also commended by the need for self-restraint in exercising the "delicate" and "final" function of judicial review, caution
animated by many of the same concerns for avoiding encroachment on
the political branches.107 But those arguments are far less persuasive in
the context of a "dormant" constitutional authority,108 and a less selfobsessed respect for the separation of powers might have warranted
embracing the constitutional questions posed by Crosby. In failing to
address directly the foreign affairs power question with which it was
properly presented – on one of the few occasions it has had to clarify
the confusion wrought by Zschernig – the Court essentially confirmed
the impression that Congress was the more certain vehicle for resolving
federal-state foreign policy conflicts. As previously noted, there were
also strong hints of executive authority, and the time may yet come
when the Court is forced to clarify that authority's preemptive effect (or,
for that matter, the preemptive effect of the dormant Commerce Clause,
or that of the Senate's responsibilities under the Treaty Clause). In the
interim, though, the President may be forgiven for concluding that statutory preemption is a far safer course, and for taking pains to avoid litigating a case solely on the basis of dormant constitutional authority. In
Crosby, the Court might have affirmed the President's authority without
diminishing that of Congress or the Senate,109 and its failure to resolve
105. Nor, obviously, did the Court purport to read the Massachusetts statute so as to avoid
conflict with federal law.
106. By the same token, though, such occasions avoid the criticism that the Ashwander approach undermines the best interpretation of congressional language. Although Professor
Schauer rightly finds all of Brandeis' principles mingled within the notion that courts should construe statutes so as to avoid constitutional questions, see Schauer, supra note 104, at 72, his criticisms fail adequately to distinguish the lesser-included principle of choosing between (unrelated)
stat utory and constitutional questions.
107. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003,
1035-55 (1994) (reviewing horizontal justifications for avoiding constitutional que stions). As
Professor Kloppenberg' s discussion reflects, not everyone agrees that the judiciary's function is to
duck constitutional questions. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and
the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984).
108. As previously noted, neither the monopoly orthodoxy nor the dormant treaty power
would begrudge the federal government the ability to alter the states' role via positive law.
109. It would have been wholly unnecessary in Crosby to determine the outer limits of the
President's treaty authority in the event of a clash with the Senate, or to reconcile the treaty power
with Congress's control over foreign commerce.
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the question entailed a shift of power from the President to Congress –
acquiescence that the Court may eventually consider probative of constitutional meaning. 110
Federalism concerns might be the clearer argument for avoidance,111
but here too matters are less clear than they might seem. To be sure,
confirming the monopoly orthodoxy or a dormant treaty power would
leave less authority in the first instance to the states, and the Court's rule
instead places the burden on the federal government to intervene.112
One may wonder, though, whether such an approach really avoids prejudging the point at issue.113 If, for example, the Constitution precludes
state bargaining with foreign powers absent federal permission, the fundamental objective of the principle may be lost if courts are unwilling to
enforce it without waiting for political intervention. Constitutional forbearance may, in other words, inflict constitutional harm, and not just in
the sense of leaving interesting questions undecided.
Crosby reminds us, therefore, that the warrant for judicial minimalism "is not separable from an evaluation of the underlying substantive
controversies"114 or, for that matter, from its institutional context. This

110. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (explaining that "longcontinued . . . practice raise[s] presumption [of congressional consent]").
111. See Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909) (affirming injunctive relief against state officials on basis of state law, rather than federal constitution); Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 117 (1984) (courts presented with pendant statelaw claims may resolve cases on that basis, and "usually should do so in order to avoid federal
constitutional que stions"); cf. Kloppenberg, supra note 107, at 1025-27, 1055-65 (considering
Pullman abstention and the adequate and independent state grounds doctrines as species of Ashwander's "last resort" rule).
112. Even here, the traditional reasoning, developed in cases preferring state-law grounds for
decision, is not wholly applicable to circumstances where either basis for decision is federal. See
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 163 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that state-law grounds are commonly preferred because they reserve greater decision-making autonomy to the states, which
might revise the rules in question); id. at 162 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing desire to avoid duplicative litigation in many jurisdictions, as well as avoiding unnecessary decision of constit utional questions); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947)
(same).
It is possible, of course, that the Court might have vindicated the states had it reached the constitutional question, and thereby disadvantaged them in refraining from doing so. Just so, avoiding constitutional questions does not really benefit Congress where courts would have vindicated
its authority. But the assumption in the latter case, at least, appears to be that constitutional adjudication's potential downside for political authorities is greater than in its potential benefits, an
assumption that is particularly compelling given the now-prevalent assumption of virtually plenary congressional power.
113. As indicated above, Crosby also reinforces the suspicion that the Court is never very
good at avoiding the Constitution, given the sprinkling throughout the opinion of holdings and
dicta regarding the respective powers of the states and the federal go vernment.
114. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term – Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 30 (1996).
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deserves special attention in the foreign relations context. Invoking
Ashwander lets the political branches (and the states) operate unfettered
by the judiciary's interpretation of the Constitution – creating lacunae, in
other words, for independent lawmaking.115 But these lacunae, and this
independence, are not so easily maintained in the international sphere.
Passages in Crosby demonstrate the Court's understanding that U.S. foreign relations law is forged in part by the interaction between the political branches and foreign powers, and that the effectiveness of this interaction in securing U.S. objectives may be influenced by the political
branches' domestic authority. What the Court fails to acknowledge is
the degree to which uncertainty over those prerogatives can equally affect outcomes, and – crucially – how international law and policy will
continue to be forged even in the absence of effective U.S. participation.
Foreign powers will undoubtedly continue to devote energies to Capitol
Hill, and the statehouses, as well as to formal diplomatic channels. And
where those audiences do not converge, and their authority is obscure,
other nations can and should take the lead in establishing international
norms that may touch on U.S. interests. It may be hoped that the Court
will recognize that diplomacy is as delicate and, potentially, final, as its
own authority, and see fit to overcome Crosby's reticence by conforming U.S. foreign relations law more clearly to the Constitution's dictates.

115. To be sure, the invitation to state lawmaking is not so great as if the Court had ruled in
their favor, particularly given the (waning) shadow cast by Zschernig. But it is abundantly clear
that the states are not substantially deterred by the uncertainty. But see The Supreme Court, 1999
Term – Leading Cases, supra note 6, at 354-59 (assuming that lingering doubts will deter subnational legislation touching on foreign affairs).

